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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

-------------------------------------------- ---------------------SHIRLEY W. ADAMS
Plaintiff and
Appellant

Case No. 15, 673

vs.
CHARLES W. ADAMS
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff pursuant to the
continuing jurisdiction of the District Court in a domestic matter,
based on an Order to Show Cause issued by the Trial Court as to
why the Defendant should not be ordered to pay alimony which had
accrued and remained unpaid.

Defendant objected to the Order to

Show Cause, on the bases that Plaintiff was estopped from claiming
any past due alimony,

and requested the Trial Court to terminate

Defendant's alimony obligation under the Decree.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court in its decision held that the Defendant
erroneously but in good faith believed his alimony obligation
to the Plaintiff had terminated at the time he obtained custody

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

Library Services and Technology Act,Thereafter,
administered by the Utahfor
State Library.
a period of more
of his children in March
1972.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

than five

(5) years the Defendant did not pay alimony to the

Plaintiff and no claim therefore was asserted by her against
him until October 1977,

1

at which time arrearages had accrued unde:

the terms of the Decree in the amount of Seven Thousand Five H
uni1
and Ninety Dollars ($7,590.00).
The Court found that the Plaintiff knew or should have knowt
within a few months after the children were awarded to the Defent·
ant in March 1972,

not exceeding six months,

that the Defendant

did not recognize any obligation to pay alimony,

and at that tioc

Plaintiff had the duty to inform the Defendant that she claimed
alimony,

if in fact she did so claim, and in equity and good

conscious Plaintiff could not remain silent concerning her claio,
thereby lulling Defendant into inaction with respect to seekiq
a modification of the Decree.

Futhermore, the Court held that

Plaintiff is estopped to claim alimony against the Defendant
except as to any artearages which had accumulated to the

timet~'

children were awarded
to the Defendant in March 1972, and for
I
six months thereafter.

The Court also found that for good cause

shown the Decree was to be modified reducing alimony to the sn
One Dollar ($1.00) per year.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays

that the judgment of the Trial Court

be affirmed and that a finding be made that the Trial Court
did not abuse its discretion based upon the facts of this
particular case,

there by affirming the Lower Court's decision

and awarding Defendant his costs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on May 13, 1954, and divorced
on March 27, 1970.

The Decree was modified on June 16, 1970,

January 17, 1972, and March 31, 1972.

The last modification

awarded custody of the minor children of the parties to the
Defendant and terminated the child support obligations.
From March 1972, until the time the action was initiated
by the Plaintiff in October 1977, the Defendant paid no alimony.
However, he did pay the sum of Seven Hundred and Seven Dollars
and fifty cents ($707.50) which was a payment on a Judgment past
due.

Never during the five and a half year period from 1972 to

1977 did the Plaintiff make any claim against the Defendant for
alimony she claimed was due and owing.

The Defendant continued

to reside in Utah County and made no attempt at all to avoid the
Plaintiff and as a matter of fact had contacts with her during
that period of time.

(T., 12,13,14,15)

The Defendant further

testified that prior to March 1972 his former wife was constantly
pursuing him if he became delinquent on the support and obligation
paymen~s.

However, after March 1972, no effort at all was made

to contact the Defend•nt with regard to the claimed alimony.
(T., 11)

The Defendant remarried in June 1973; purchased a home for

him and his new family and has continued to reside in Utah County.
( T.

I

11)
The Trial Court found that a substantial change of circum-

stances had occurred since the time of the last modification of the
Decree to justify the reduction of alimony to the sum of One Dollar
($1.00) per year.

In 1972 at the time the Divorce Decree was last
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modified,

1

the Plaintiff was unemployed,

Si "'" ' " . . . . . " " '

has been employed full time at the Utah State Training School in'

I

American Fork, Utah.

With that full time employment she has be"

able to obtain income at the rate of Six Hundred and Thirty-Nine
Dollars ($639.00) per month gross.

(T., 18,19)

Plaintiff does

not have the responsibility of supporting anyone other than
herself inasmuch as the children are living with their father
and have been since March 1972.
Dollars ($639.00)

The Six Hundred and Thirty-Nine

is allocated to her own private needs rather
(T.,l9)

than for the support of any other individual.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL MAY BE RAISED AS
A DEFENSE TO PAYMENT OF ALIMONY WHEN THE
HUSBAND RELIED UPON THE WIFE'S SILENCE OR
FAILURE TO PURSUE HER CLAIM WHERE SHE HAD
A LEGAL OR MORAL DUTY TO SPEAK.
Appellant cites several cases in support of her contention.
and although the principles remain the same, application of thn!
principles may differ since each of the cited cases is distir
guishable on the facts.
In Openshaw v. Openshaw,

los Uta h 574 ,

144 P.2d 5 28 (194li

Defendant-Husband had raised no defense of estoppel and in fact
the Trial Court invoked the doctrine of laches on behalf of th<
Defendant-Husband, not the doctrine of estoppel as was effect!'
asserted in the instant case.

In Openshaw,

the equ ities of th'

case clearly favored the Plaintiff-Wife since the Defendant
openly acknowledged that he owed alimony, had

0

f t en

t r i ed t0
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hi·
;·

the Court to reduce the amount, had been found guilty of contempt
for not making the payments, and had tried to mislead the Court by
fraud and deceit.

In the case at hand, the equities are much more

evenly balanced and the decision of the Trial Court should be
looked on favorably,
Appellant urges that French v. Johnson, 16 Utah 2d 360, 401
P.2d 315 (1965), is A FORTIORI to the instant case.

French involved

a default in child support payments, and because of the distinct
nature of the child support obligation, the respondent feels
French is not A FORTIORI to the instant case, especially since in
French this Court looked very heavily at the parental responsibility,
and in the three to two decision, the dissent would have released
the father from the child support decree even though he had the
moral parental obligation.

However, French did rely on a principle

which is concededly applicable to the instant case:

"Mere silence

over a period of time will not raise an estoppel where there is
no legal or moral duty to speak".
case,

(Id. p315).

In the instant

the Trial Court did find a legal or moral duty to speak on

the part of the Appellant, and considering the particular facts of
the situation, the Trial Court appropriately used its discretion
to so find.
Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (1974), again involves child
support payments which differ distinctively from alimony partially
because the right to receive child support payments is held by the
children and cannot be estopped by actions of the parents,
especially in~ where the claimed estoppel was based to a
considerable extent upon conduct and statements of a third party.
~ Sponsored
is a case
deals
with forgeneral
estoppel
principles
by the S.J. that
Quinney Law
Library. Funding
digitization provided
by the Institute
of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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which are,

if looked at in light of the peculiar facts,

l

applicabi;'

to the instant case,
This Court held in Utah State Building_ Commission v • Gre.!.!
American Indemnity Company,

105 Utah 11, 140 P. 2d 763 0943),

n,

mere inaction or silence may, under peculiar circumstances, amon
to both misrepresentation and concealment which may amount to an
estoppel.

The two caveats of that decision are that the Plaintil

must have a right to speak but did not exercise that right, and
that there must be a duty on the part of the Plaintiff to speak,
Clearly the Plaintiff in the instant case had a right to speak
and did not do so for over five years, and clearly it is the
Plaintiff's duty to assert her cl~im for alimony, not the duty~
anyone else to claim for her,
This Court,

in Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P.2d 5!'

(1956), held that:
"Where the father's failure to make such payments
was induced by her representations or actions"
(such as silence, 28 AmJur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver
§53) "and where as a result of such representations
or actions the father has been lulled into failing
to make such payments and into changing his position
which he would not have done but for such representations, and that as a result for such failure to pay
and change in his conditions it will cause him great
hardship and injustice if she is allowed to enforce
the payment of such back installments, she may be
thereby estopped from enforcing the payment of such
back installments,"
(p.598)
This Court may use the principle setforth in Larsen to avoid
the great hardship that would result by now forcing the Respondi
to make such payments after having been lulled into not making
payments

through the Appellant's failure

to assert her right

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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thereto.
By way of analogy, if a divorced wife is not claiming
reimbursement for expenses and has,

in fact, supported herself and

has received support from a second husband, then estoppel will be
allowed.

Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P. 2d 895 (Utah, 1976).

Although the Wasescha decision depended heavily on the wife's
remarriage,

the same reasons for looking at remarriage apply here.

The Appellant has supported herself and has not found it necessary
to rely on the Respondent for over five and a half years, so that
the Trial Court was within its discretion to find that estoppel
should apply especially when the claim would operate to create
injustice and undue burden.
This principle has been affirmed by this Court, by Mr. Justice
Crockett concurring in Wallis v. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237, 342 P.2d
103 (1959), and subscribed to by this Court in Peterson v. Peterson,
530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974):
"The purpose of the provision for alimony and support
money is to provide for the current needs, and not to
allow the beneficiary to sit by and permit a burdensome debt to accumulate and then use it to harass the
defendant so that he cannot hold a job or live a
respectable existence."
The Trial Court has not abused its discretion in its Findings
of Fact and it has conscientiously applied principles of law to
the particular facts of this case in an equitable fashion.

None

of this Court's previous decisions will be adversely affected by
upholding this decision.

Estoppel has been found based on silence

with a duty to speak and on the balancing of equities of this case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Each statute of limitations already imposes a duty to
within a given time period or risk losing that claim.

It ia

already the duty of the claim-holder to pursue and enforce that
claim.

Upholding this case will not extend any statute of limit!·

tiona or create any new duties, but will recognize the equities'
of this particular fact situation and will reaffirm the duty of
the Trial Court to use educated discretion.

POINT II
THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL SHOULD
BE ALLOWED TO APPLY SO AS TO BEST FIT THE
NEEDS OF A PARTICULAR SITUATION.
Respondent agrees with the equitable principle urged on the
Court by the Appellant,

but feels that application of this

principle will not alter the result in this case and that perha,.'
application of this principle is not even appropriate.

The

principle is thus articulated by the United States Supreme Court
"Where one of two innocent persons must suffer a
loss, and one of them has contributed to produce
it, the law throws the burden upon him and not
upon the other party".
Pompton v. Cooper Union,
101 u.s. 196 (1879)
This Court said in Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber, S1!

P.2d 1121 (1974):
"Ordinarily, where one of two innocent parties must
suffer a loss it should be borne by the one whose
conduct created the circumstances which permitted
the loss to occur.
But here there are other and
more important considerations which provide the
"
controlling solution to the problem confronted here •
Appellant construes the facts

to find that the Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is the party through whose agency the loss occurred.

In this

situtation it appears equally possible to construe the facts so that
the Appellant is the responsible party, or perhaps that neither
party carries any more responsibility than the other.
Appellant contends that the Respondent "must have or should
have known that the burden to further modify the Decree regarding
alimony payments was also his burden," but it is just as easy to
suppose that the Respondent thought he was modifing the entire Decree
when he modified the child support payments.

Since the nature of

alimony is often a little unclear even to experienced members of the
bar, then why should we assume that the Respondent had any better
understanding of the relation of alimony to child support.

In fact,

he testified that he thought the Decree had ended any obligation
he had to her,

(T,, 8,9)

Appellant further asserts that any loss could not have occurred
through her agency because she was not even present for the Decree
modification, and that she made no representations concerning discontinuance of alimony payments.

One might wonder why Appellant was

not present at that time and why she waits for more than five years
to bring her claim for back payments.

Previous to the Decree, the

Appellant hounded the Respondent continually for support payments,
and then for five years was silent.

(T.,8,9)

As Appellant points

out, reasons and motivations for the actions of the two parties is
largely a matter of conjecture.

Respondent feels that identifying

the party through whose agency the loss occurred is not nearly
as simple as Appellant seems to believe, and that in this case the
Court should affirm the decision of the Trial Court as it decided
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The nature of the doctrine of estoppel extends beyond
principles,

This Court in Petterson v. Ogden City, 11 Utah 125,

176 P.2d 599 (1947), used another principle which may contrast
with the one urged upon the Court here.

This Court stated:

"Both laches and estoppel are bars which in certain
circumstances may be raised to defeat a right or
claim a party otherwise would have.
The Courts
refuse to give their aid to the party who has slept
on his rights or who because of his actions or
inaction when it is required was not fairly entitled
to relief.
(p. 604)
And as was stated in American Jurisprudence, 28 Am Jur 2d, Esto!:
and Waiver §28, and applied in an Idaho case, Dalton Highway Dirt
of Kootenai County v. Sowder, 401 P.2d 813 (Idaho, 1965):
" Since, however, the principle that underlies equitable
estoppel in its proper sense runs throughout all the
transactions and contracts of civilized life, such
estoppels cannot be subjected to fined and settled
rules of universal application, like legal estoppels,
or hampered by the narrow confines of a technical rule."
Respondent urges that the Trial Court was within its discrl'
to apply the principles of equitable estoppel as it saw the pu:
ular eqities and should therefore be supported in its decision.

POINT III
A PARTY MAY BE ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING PAST
DUE INSTALLMENTS OF ALIMONY AWARDS.
Appellant totally misconstrues the action of the Trial ~~
as retroactively modifying the alimony award when in fact it
estopped the Appellant from claiming past due alimony payment!
and only prospectively modified the award.
While the general rule appears to be that alimony wards''
not be retroactively modified, even if no estoppel was found,
·

1

h · h would allow the Court

f

couldby the
have
been
part1cu
ardigitization
acts
w by1cthe Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for
provided
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

apply an exception to the general rule.

It is commonly accepted

that subsequent remarriage of the wife will terminate the husband's
support obligation to her.

Kent v. Kent, 28 Utah 2d 34, 497 P.2d

652 (1972); Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284 (1954).
While the wife's remarriage did not occur in this case, it points
out that there must be exceptions to any general rule when there
are equities involved.

The basis for the exception of terminating

the husband's obligation when the wife remarries is that she has
acquired support from another source and it would not be equitable
for her to receive support from two sources.

(Austad, Id. P• 288).

Many of the former notions concerning alimony are being dissipated
as we come to realize that women can be self-sufficient and that
there is little basis for giving women an inalienable right to
support from their former husbands.

In 1954, District Judge Hoyt,

in his concurring opinion in Austad v. Austad, Id. p. 292, said:
"Certainly it is unjust to compel a husband to continue
to support a divorced wife who has remarried and has
adequate support from another husband.
But other situations also come before the courts where it is inequitable
to compel a divorced husband to pay accrued installments
of alimony or of support money for support of children in
accordance with the terms of a divorce decree.
If a
divorced wife, who has been awarded custody of children
and an allowance from the husband for their support,
thereafter deserts the children and they are taken
over and cared for by the husband, it is clearly desirable and equitable to relieve him of payment of support
money from the date of such desertion. Why should it
be held that the court has no power to do equity in such
a situation?
If it so happens, as it very often does,
that the divorced husband fails to apply promptly to the
Court for modification of the decree, shall we say that
he must therefore pay the installments ordered to be
paid up to the date of the order of modification, or as
some courts have said, up to the date of his applicattion for modification?
Should the court put such a
penalty of lack of vigilance?
I believe not."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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J

Judge Hoyt also pointed out that the statute cited b
Appellant,

Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 0953),

tions on retroactive modification,

and in fact

places no :e:::ic·
the statute

changes as are reasonable and necessary.
An alimony award that is not allowed to be modififed
according to the equities of the particular situation would

as&ut

I
the character of a punishment.
forcing past due

There would be no purpose in en·

installments of alimony when the wife has alrea:

supported herself adequately.
Estoppel has been accepted as an equitable principle thatt!
be applied to cases such as this.

Larsen v. Larsen, supra.

The

Trial Court appropriately used its discretion in applying estopp
to this case and its decision should not be disturbed.

POINT IV
PROOF OF CHANGED CONDITIONS ARISING SINCE
THE LAST MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE CAN
BE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A REDUCTION OF
ALIMONY.
Appellant contends

that no adequate change of circumstanc''

is present in order to justify a reduction of alimony.
Court

found

that there was a significant change of circumstanc<!

since the e.ntry of the Decree (Findings of Fact 4!8),
that

finding

allows

611

the Court to maintain jurisdiction over the matter.

cerning the Appellant no

fact

and based

it reduced the alimony to $1.00 per year which

The Court's comment as cited by the Appellant

for

The lr

the children,
on which

(T., 25) con·

longer having custody of or obligatiO'

does not necessarily mean that that was the·

the Trial Court based

its decision.

In reviewir•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

the evidence, it could easily have decided to reduce the alimony
based on the Appellant's increased earning capacity and selfsuffience, and on the remarriage of the Respondent and his
establishing a home for the four children.
The Trial Court's finding must be looked at in a light most
favorable to the Respondent, and its exercise of discretion according to the equities of this case must be given deference and the
modification allowed to stand.

POINT V
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S
FEES EITHER ON THE APPEAL OR AT TRIAL BELOW.
At common law, attorney's fees were not recoverable by either
party, and this Court has repeatedly held that attorney's fees are
not awardable where there is no statutory sanction therefor or
where there is no agreement between the parties.

Hawkins v. Perry,

123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953); C.G. Horman Co. v. Lloyd, 28 Utah
2d 112, 499 P.2d 124 (1972); Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah,
1977).
Attorney's fees on appeal are said to be discretionary with
this Court and then only when specifically authorized by statute or
rule of court.

Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 556 P.2d

1273 (Utah 1976); Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment Co.,
Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 209 (1955).
Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977) announces what may
be construed as a rule of court, but would only apply where the
order of the Trial Court is patently erroneous.

Repsondent urges

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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,

that that is not the case here, that the facts in this case areil
no way comparable to those in

~.

and that the Trial Court in

this case was well within its discretion to apply the rule of
equity to the facts as it saw them, and that in this case the
Appellant is not entitled to attorney's fees, either on

this~~

or at the hearing below.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant respectfully submits that the Trial Court dia
not abuse its discretion in arriving at its findings,

Total

examination of all of the evidences in light of the circumstanc11
surrounding each of the parties with the consideration of

what~

fair and equitable to the parties herein can very well allow
this Court to find that the Trial Court acted within its discret
and acted properly in arriving at its decision and therefore th<
same should be affirmed.
DATED and SIGNED this ~day of May, 1978.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

il#_

~f'L

Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
STOTT, YOUNG AND WILSON
350 East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84601
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Defendant-Respondent to C. J. Jaussi, attorney for
Plaintiff-Appellant, 424 South State Street, Orem, Utah 84057,
postage prepaid this

~4~y

of May,

1978.
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